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ABSTRACT
Authentication protocols are very common mechanisms to confirm the legitimacy of some-
one’s or something’s identity in digital and physical systems.
This thesis presents a new and robust authentication method based on users’ multiple
devices. Due to the popularity of mobile devices, users are becoming more likely to have
more than one device (e.g., smartwatch, smartphone, laptop, tablet, smart-car, smart-ring,
etc.). The authentication system presented here takes advantage of these multiple devices
to implement authentication mechanisms. In particular, the system requires the devices to
collaborate with each other in order for the authentication to succeed. This new authentica-
tion protocol is robust against theft-based attacks on single device; an attacker would need
to steal multiple devices in order to compromise the authentication system.
The new authentication protocol comprises an authenticator and at least two user de-
vices, where the user devices are associated with each other. To perform an authentication
on a user device, the user needs to respond a challenge by using his/her associated device.
After describing how this authentication protocol works, this thesis will discuss three differ-
ent versions of the protocol that have been implemented. In the first implementation, the
authentication process is performed by using two smartphones. Also, as a challenge, a QR
code is used. In the second implementation, instead of using a QR code, NFC technology
is used for challenge transmission. In the last implementation, the usability with different
platforms is exposed. Instead of using smartphones, a laptop computer and a smartphone
combination is used. Furthermore, the authentication protocol has been verified by using an
automated protocol-verification tool to check whether the protocol satisfies authenticity and
vi
secrecy properties. Finally, these implementations are tested and analyzed to demonstrate
the performance variations over different versions of the protocol.
vii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Access control is a crucial component in many digital and physical systems in order to
prevent unauthorized access to sensitive information. Access control policies are designed to
ensure appropriate access to sensitive information and resources (e.g., smartphones, servers,
smartwatches, operating systems, web applications). Hence, authentication methods are the
key mechanism to enforce access control policies as well as protect access to secure systems.
1.1 Background
There are three standard approaches (factors) in authentication schemes:
• Authentication with something the user knows
• Authentication with something the user has
• Authentication with something the user is
A wide variety of authentication methods has been developed for access control systems.
One of the most popular techniques is using a username and a password for authentication.
Another common approach for extensive security is authentication with bio-metric identity
(e.g.: fingerprint, retina). In addition to these techniques, multi-factor authentication is also
commonly accepted by enterprise organizations.
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1.1.1 Single-factor Authentication
Single-factor authentication is a cost-effective solution to implement access control mecha-
nisms into the systems. Only one of the authentication factors needs to be used to implement
single-factor authentication.
Using something the user knows, such as a username and a password, four-digit pin num-
ber, is a common solution in digital systems. For example, many of the web applications
(e.g., email clients, social network applications) uses a username and a password authen-
tication scheme [1]. Moreover, in mobile systems, four-digit pin number authentication is
popular way to implement screen locks.
On the other hand, enforcing access control policies in physical systems are achieved
by using something the user has. Physical tokens are a good example for these kind of
authentication schemes [2]. For instance, ID cards could be used to unlock an office door or
a garage gate. Furthermore, a credit or debit card are also examples of authentication by
using something the user has.
Another way to implement an authentication method is fallowing the something the user
is approach. Using the users’ biometric identity is a common strategy for authentication
protocols [3]. In some systems, the user needs to scan her/his fingerprint, retina or iris in
order to prove her/his identity. In addition, face recognition techniques are considered in
the domain of authentication schemes that use something the user is.
1.1.2 Multi-factor Authentication
Multi-factor authentication is another approach for implementing access control methods
by using at least two of three authentication factors[1]. Introducing at least one more factor
into the authentication process increases the difficulty of credential falsification.
In some systems, a fingerprint (something the user is) and a password (something the
user knows) combination is used in order to implement multi-factor authentication. Similarly,
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using a debit card (something the user has) and a pin number (something the user knows)
is also common way to authenticate the users into banking systems.
However, the great concern with these existing authentication methods is the vulnera-
bility against theft-based attacks [4]. In each scheme, the attacker could steal the identity
information, such as a username and a password, a bio-metric identity or a token device,
and access the users’ sensitive information.
1.2 An Overview of the New Authentication Method
The new authentication method presented in this thesis is an innovative way to authen-
ticate users by using users’ multiple devices. This method uses at least two pre-associated
(paired) devices to authenticate. The user devices need to cooperate with each other in
order to respond to a challenge and successfully authenticate. Using associated devices is a
robust way to prevent theft-based attacks on authentication protocols. Theoretical analysis
has been done on the new authentication protocol in Jean-Baptiste Subils’ thesis [5]. Ad-
ditionally, a U.S. Utility Patent Application regarding the new authentication method was
filed April 22, 2015 [6].
This thesis argues that the presented authentication protocol can be easily implemented
to solve real-life authentication problems, and these implementations can have satisfactory
performance. Furthermore, the authentication protocol can be model checked by a model
checker to ensure that it satisfies secrecy and authenticity properties.
Throughout this thesis, terms “first device” and “device one” refer to the device that is
attempting to authenticate some system. Terms “second device” and “device two” refer to
the device with which the user is performing a task or a challenge to prove his/her identity.
Also, the term “challenge” represents a required task to complete authentication.
After defining the new authentication method, this thesis will discuss three different
versions of the protocol that have been designed and implemented. The main purpose of
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introducing the different set of implementations is to demonstrate the new authentication
protocol’s adaptability to different authentication problems.
In the first implementation, the authentication process is performed by using two smart-
phones. Also, as a challenge, a QR code is used. When the first device attempts to access
the system, the system sends a QR code to the device one. Then, the user needs to scan
this QR code with his/her second smartphone in order to perform the challenge. Finally, the
authenticator system decides whether or not the authentication is successful. Moreover, to
demonstrate the authentication process with two smartphones and a QR code, an Android
application was developed and installed into the smartphones. Also, a web server application
was developed and deployed to represent the authenticator system.
In the second implementation, a different challenge transmission technique usage is
demonstrated. Instead of using a QR code, NFC technology is used for challenge trans-
mission. Similar to the first implementation, two smartphones, which run the Android
application, and a web server application are used.
In the last implementation, the usability with different platforms is exposed. Instead
of using smartphones, a laptop computer and a smartphone combination is used. In this
particular implementation, the laptop attempts to access to sensitive information on some
system. To perform an authentication, the authenticator system sends a QR code to the
laptop computer, and the user scans this QR code by using his/her smartphone. Finally, the
authenticator system grants or denies access to the laptop computer. Similarly to previous
implementations, the same Android and web server application was used in the smartphone
and the authenticator server. However, new client application have been designed and im-
plemented for laptop computer.
After introducing particular implementations, the authentication protocol was verified by
using an automated security protocol verification tool (Chapter 5). To check if the authen-
tication protocol satisfied the authenticity and the secrecy properties, a security protocol
verification tool needed to be used. At first, the authentication protocol was modeled using
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a high level protocol specification language. Then, the protocol was verified to show the
secrecy and the authenticity properties were not violated.
These implementations were tested and analyzed to demonstrate the performance vari-
ations over different versions of the protocol. The different implementations compared in
terms of execution time, battery usage, network traffic and memory consumption. The most
effective authentication performance was observed while using two smartphones and NFC
technology for challenge transmission. Using the NFC protocol instead of QR code images
significantly decreased the network traffic and battery usage. However, measured execution
time results were close to each other.
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 expresses the related work.
Chapter 3 describes the system design of the new authentication protocol. Chapter 4 in-
troduces different real life implementations of authentication protocol. Chapter 5 analyzes
the implementations in detail. Chapter 6 discusses future work, describes other possibilities,
and concludes the thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
Access control determines who can access system resources [7]. There are two main parts
of broad access control definition, authorization and authentication [2]. Authorization is
the process of specifying access rights to the resources. Further, authentication is the set of
procedures that determines whether someone or something should be allowed access to some
system or resources [2].
Authentication methods are a very common way to confirm the legitimacy of someone’s
or something’s identity in digital and physical systems. The standard three factors in au-
thentication techniques are something the user knows (e.g., a password), something the user
has (e.g., a hardware token device) and something the user is (e.g., a fingerprint) [1]. In
order to achieve an authentication, one of the factors can be used. Also, the factors can
be combined to create a multi-factor authentication. This chapter compares and contrasts
closely related common authentication methods with the new authentication protocol.
2.1 Authentication Using Something the User Knows
One of the most popular approaches is using something the user knows as an authen-
tication factor. Passwords are an example of authentication methods based on something
the user knows [1]. Furthermore, a username and password authentication scheme is mainly
used in online web applications (e.g., online banking applications, social media platforms,
mail clients).
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Another approach to implement authentication mechanisms based on something the user
know is asking personal questions from the users, such as “What was the make of your first
car,” “What is your first pet’s name” [8]?
2.1.1 Advantages and Disadvantages
A major advantage of the traditional username and password scheme is that it is very easy
to implement. A wide variety of password encryption tools exist in order to store passwords
in the systems. Moreover, password authentication is relatively easy to use because users
are accustomed to it [9].
Researchers have been studying the vulnerabilities of the username and password schemes.
One of the common problems with passwords is attackers can guess the password [10]. Users
are more likely to choose simple passwords in order to better remember them in the future.
Spear phishing and social engineering is also another major attack model with passwords.
The attacker can send a fake email and ask for the username and/or password from the
user [11, 12]. Also, another survey showed that more than 70% of people would reveal their
passwords for just a candy bar [13].
2.2 Authentication Using Something the User Is
Biometric identifiers, e.g., finger prints, voice prints, retina scans, are examples of an
authentication scheme based on something the user is. Before the authentication starts, the
authenticator system needs to take users’ biometric measurements in order to identify them.
Then, when users want to access the system, the authentication mechanism analyzes and
verifies users’ identities [1]. In order to identify users, systems can read fingerprints, scan
retinas, scan voices, read signatures.
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2.2.1 Advantages and Disadvantages
Since users can forget passwords and lose hardware devices (e.g., hardware token, bank
card), something the user is based authentication mechanism could be used. Furthermore,
these authentication schemes are cost-effective; after setting up the authentication infras-
tructure, there is no need for extra device utilization.
User identity theft is one of the major concerns with “something the user is” based au-
thentication mechanisms. The attacker could steal the fingerprints of users and authenticate
the system. Similarly, the attacker could also spoof voice samples, retina images or signatures
of users [14, 15].
The replay attack is also another vulnerability in the biometric authentication scheme [14].
The attacker could steal the fingerprint information from the authenticator device after a
successful authentication. Additionally, uniqueness is another concern for biometric authen-
tication. Two different people could have the same characteristics of their faces, signatures
or voice prints [16].
2.3 Authentication Using Something the User Has
Some authentication schemes require a physical object in order to complete authen-
tication. These physical objects, known as “something the user has,” are factors of the
authentication. Physical tokens are one of the most popular examples of this scheme [17].
RSA securId [18], Battle.net authenticator [19], yubico [20] are instances of implementation
of the physical tokens.
Magnetic strip cards are another popular example similar to hardware tokens. Magnetic
strip cards (e.g., id cards, credit cards, smart card) are widely used to authenticate the users
into the systems.
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2.3.1 Advantages and Disadvantages
A wide variety of solutions has been introduced to identify the users with physical au-
thenticator devices [21, 22, 23, 24]. The popularity of studies on the something the user has
authentication schemes leads to cost-effective solutions to authentication problems.
Theft-based attacks is one of the major concerns in something the user has based authen-
tication mechanisms [4]. A physical token device, such as an id card, or a credit card could
be stolen by an attacker and the attacker could easily access systems. In addition, another
common attack model on token devices are the replay attacks [25], in which, physical token
devices or credit cards could be copied by an attacker and used to gain access to systems.
Clock drift, battery and synchronization problems are other examples of physical token
issues. In a certain time period, users need to do maintenance in order to reuse their token
devices [26].
2.4 Multi-factor Authentication
Multi-factor authentication mechanisms combine at least two of three authentication fac-
tors (something the user knows, something the user has, something the user is). Automated
Teller Machines (ATMs) extensively uses the two-factor authentication scheme during the
bank transactions. For example, withdrawing money from ATM requires a bank or a credit
card (something the user has) and a personal identification number (PIN) (something the
user knows). Another common example of multi-factor authentication schemes is a combi-
nation of an RSA securID physical token and a password [27].
2.4.1 Advantages and Disadvantages
In the single factor authentication schemes, a token device can be stolen or a password
can get compromised. Introducing multiple authentication factors can diminish the attack
surface. For example, if an attacker compromises the hardware token in a two-factor authen-
tication scheme using a password and a hardware token, the system still remain inaccessible.
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Although multi factor authentication schemes have improved the security compared to
single factor authentication schemes, the usability is a major concern [28]. Users may need
to carry additional devices (e.g., physical token) on them. Moreover, since there are multiple
factors involved in authentication, extra steps need to be performed in order to complete
authentication. Users can get tired of performing extra steps and disable the multi-factor
authentication feature from systems.
2.5 Challenge-Response Mechanisms
Challenge-response mechanisms use one-time usable identifiers as an authentication fac-
tor. For example, instead of using the same password, the authenticator system uses one-time
passwords [1]. One-time passwords are the ideal example of challenge response mechanisms.
In every authentication attempt, the system generates a random password and sends it to
the user. In addition to one-time passwords, using a hardware token (e.g., mobile phone,
physical token device) is another approach to implement challenge-response mechanisms.
CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans
Apart) is another example of a challenge-response mechanism that tests whether the user is
human or not [29].
2.5.1 Advantages and Disadvantages
Challenge-response mechanisms are robust against bot attacks on the system [1]. Fur-
thermore, many challenge-response mechanisms (e.g., CPATCHA) are very popular and easy
to implement.
Dictionary attacks are a common attack model on challenge-response mechanisms [1]. If
an attacker knows the challenge and the response, a dictionary attack can be performed to
predict one-time passwords. Furthermore, there are many studies showing that CHAPCHA-
based mechanisms can get compromised by automated systems [30, 31, 32].
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CHAPTER 3
SYSTEM DESIGN
This chapter introduces the system design of the new authentication protocol. Unlike the
traditional authentication techniques (e.g., username and password, bio-metric identity, RSA
securId), this new authentication method requires at least two associated (paired) devices
to complete the authentication process.
This new authentication method is a one-factor authentication mechanism. Furthermore,
this technique uses at least two user devices as the “what the user has” factor of authentica-
tion. Instead of using additional devices (e.g., hardware token, id-card), using user devices
is a cost-effective solution to implement this authentication protocol. Therefore, the authen-
tication protocol implementations are easy to deploy into systems.
The association of multiple devices with a user is an innovative way to prevent device
theft. All user devices need to be granted a private key or create their own private key, during
the registration phase. In this regard, all of the associated devices need to participate in the
authentication process. For example, if two smartphones are associated with a particular
user and one of them is stolen, the attacker needs the private key of the other device to
authenticate the stolen device.
The public key infrastructure (PKI) has been used to ensure confidentiality and integrity
of shared information during the authentication process [2]. The device pairing process is
an essential part to sharing public keys of the devices. The device pairing process should be
done in registration phase and the registration should be performed before the authentication
starts.
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First Device
Second Device
Authenticator
1 – Requests Access
2 – Sends Authentication Challenge
3 – Transfers
      Challenge
4 – Sends Authentication Challenge
5 – Sends Access Acknowledgment
Figure 3.1. System design overview.
During the current investigation and analysis of the protocol, the following assumptions
have been made:
• The public key infrastructure is sound and robust against network-based attacks (e.g.:
man in the middle, eavesdropping, masquerading).
• The device registration process was completed properly and the devices were paired
with each other and the user.
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the authentication protocol with two devices. In the
first step, the authentication process starts with an access request from the first device. Then
in the second step, the authenticator server generates an authentication challenge and sends
it to the first device. In the third step, the first device transmits the challenge to the second
device. In the fourth step, the second device generates a response and sends this response to
the authenticator server. Finally, in the fifth step, if the received authentication challenge is
valid, the server sends a successful access acknowledgment to the access requesting device.
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Authenticator First Device Second Device
1 - Access Request
2 - Random Number
3 - Random Number
5 - Access Granted
4 - Authentication Response
Figure 3.2. An example of the authentication protocol using two devices.
3.1 Authentication
The authentication process is the main contribution of the authentication protocol. How-
ever, in order to start the authentication process, the user needs to pair at least two devices
and register them into the authenticator system. The device pairing process will be explained
in Section 3.2 in detail.
3.1.1 Two-device Authentication
The authentication protocol requires at least two devices, which are associated with a
user, to perform an authentication process. Figure 3.2 describes in detail an example of
the authentication protocol using two devices. All the communication in the system was
designed with public key infrastructure. The device and the server have a pair of public
and private keys to encrypt communication. Additionally, all network messages contain a
time-stamp and a digital signature. PKI, digital signatures and time-stamps are vital factors
of the system design setup in order to prevent man in the middle, masquerading, and denial
of service attacks [33].
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Begin
Receive, access 
request from first device
Is request from 
first device valid?
Start timer
Generate
authentication challenge
Send 
authentication challenge
Deny access to
resource(s)
End
NO
YES
Figure 3.3. Access request handling algorithm.
In the first step, the first device sends an access request to the authenticator server.
This encrypted access request message contains a user identification information (e.g., email
address of user), a device identification information (e.g., device name), and a time stamp.
Besides this information, the message contains a digital signature that signed with the private
key of the first device.
After the authenticator server receives and encrypts this message, it runs an algorithm
to validate the access requesting device (first device) as shown in Figure 3.3. At first,
the authenticator server checks the first and the second devices’ identification information.
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  Has a new response 
been received?
Is time out?
Deny access to
resource(s)
End
Is the new 
response valid?
Grant access to
resource(s)
NO YES
Begin
NO
YES
NO
YES
Figure 3.4. Challenge verification.
These two devices need to be associated with each other in the system database. The device
association process is described in Section 3.2. Then, the server generates a random number,
and it starts a timer to limit the authentication time.
In the second step, the authenticator server sends the random number to the first device.
The randomly generated number is used as a challenge in the authentication protocol.
In the third step, the first device transmits the challenge to the second device. The
challenge transmission could be done in many alternative ways. For example, images, QR
codes, NFC protocol, vibration, sound and light waves, and infrared technology could be
used.
In the fourth step, after the second device receives the challenge, it forwards the challenge
to the authenticator server.
At this point, the authenticator server runs an algorithm to validate the challenge as
specified in Figure 3.4. First, the timer checks if the authentication time is expired. Then,
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Authenticator First Device Second Device
1 - Access Request
2 – Random Number
5 – Random Number
7 - Access Granted
6 - Authentication Response
Third Device
4 - Authentication Response
3 – Random Number
Figure 3.5. An example of the authentication protocol using three devices.
the authenticator server checks if the second device is paired with the first device. Finally,
the authenticator server checks if the challenge is valid. If all these requirements are met, in
the fifth step, the authenticator server grants access to the first device.
3.1.2 Three-device Authentication
Two-device authentication is not the only version of the authentication protocol. Hence,
more than two devices could be used to implement this authentication process. Also, since
an attacker needs to steal all associated devices in order to access the system, introducing
more devices brought extra layers of security into the authentication process.
Figure 3.5 illustrates another example of the authentication protocol using three devices.
The devices shown in Figure 3.5 need to be associated with the same user. In the first
step, the first device requests access to the authenticator server. Then, in the second step,
the authenticator server generates a random number and sends it to the first device. In
the third step, the second device receives the random number from the first device. In the
fourth step, the second device sends an authentication response back to the server. In the
fifth step, the second device sends this random number to the last device. In the sixth step,
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the third device then sends another authentication response back to the authenticator server.
If the authenticator server determines that the responses received from the second and third
devices are valid for the issued random number, the authenticator system grants the first
device access to the resource.
3.2 Registration
Registration is a vital part of the authentication protocol. In order to start an authenti-
cation process, at least two devices need to be associated.
During the authentication process, the authenticator server needs to know two pieces of
basic information: the identity of the paired devices, and the identity of the user who owns
the devices. To collect this information, a unique device name could be used as an identifier
of the device. Also, an email could be used to identify the user.
Although this proposed approach is used in this authentication protocol, it’s not the
only way to implement the registration process. Many existing techniques can be used to
enforce the registration process. Registration with call center, short message service (SMS)
activation or many alternative approaches could be used.
Device registration is not the main contribution of this thesis. Hence, the security aspects
of the registration phase is not addressed in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLEMENTATION
Implementing the authentication protocol has been useful for confirming its practicality.
This section introduces the infrastructure (Section 4.1) and the cryptographic (Section 4.2)
setup of the implementation. Then, the device pairing process is explained in Section 4.3.
Finally, this chapter presents multiple implementations of the authentication protocol with
different system configurations (Section 4.4).
Web Server
Application
Database
(MySQL)
First
Device
Second
Device
Encrypted
communication
Encrypted
communication
Database
read/write
Figure 4.1. Technical infrastructure design.
4.1 Infrastructure Setup
Implementing different versions of the authentication protocol requires flexible software
architecture in order to reduce development overhead. Hence, a flexible server infrastructure
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was designed and implemented. Thanks to this infrastructure design, the authenticator
server implementation does not need to be changed while implementing new versions of
the authentication protocol. Furthermore, the rest of the different authentication protocol
versions were developed based on this particular infrastructure setup.
4.1.1 Server Architecture
The principal mechanism to implement this authentication protocol is the authenticator
server. A web server application is suitable to implement the authenticator system of the
protocol as shown in Figure 4.1. The server application communicates with devices via
REST API [34]. Representational State Transfer (REST) is a software design approach to
implement web services. Thus, this design approach allows the web server application to
communicate with different devices regardless of their operating systems.
The web server application was implemented by using Spring Framework [35] in Java
language. The Spring Framework is a Java-based tool for developing and configuring the
enterprise web applications.
4.1.2 Database Design
Another essential contribution of this protocol is the device association process. To
associate devices, a device and user identification information are required. Hence, a simple
database was designed and implemented as shown in Figure 4.2. An email address was
used to identify the users. Also, the unique device name was used to identify the associated
devices. The associated device identity information (device name and email address) was
created during the registration phase and stored in the database.
For data storage and data persistence, MySql database and Hibernate framework [36]
were used. Hibernate is an open source object-relational mapping library project for Java
language. The goal of using a third party framework to manage database operations is to
prevent SQL injection attacks [37].
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      ID
      DeviceName
      UserName
DEVICES
      ID
      UserName
USERS
Figure 4.2. Database design.
4.1.3 Software Management and Deployment
For build automation and software dependency management, Apache Maven was used.
Apache Maven is a software project management tool for software projects [38].
This server application was deployed on the Apache Tomcat [39] application server.
Apache Tomcat is an open source Java servlet implementation for web applications.
4.2 Public Key Infrastructure Setup
The asymmetric encryption was implemented for all communication steps in the authen-
tication protocol. To implement asymmetric encryption, RSA encryption algorithm was used
in Java [40]. During the registration process, the server shares its public key with the device.
Then, the device creates its own public and private key pair and sends the public key to
the server. In every communication step, the server encrypts the data with devices’ public
key. Also, the devices decrypt the data with their private key as shown in Figure 4.3. For
example, in the second step in Figure 4.3, the server generates a random number and sends
it to the first device. The server encrypts this message with the first device’s public key.
After the first device receives this encrypted data, it decrypts by using its private key.
In order to prove the authenticity of the data in the system communication, a digital
signature scheme was used. In every communication step, the data are signed with the
devices’ private key as shown Figure 4.3. First, the server creates a hash function by using
SHA-1 hashing algorithm. SHA-1 is a cryptographic hash function [41]. Then, in the second
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Figure 4.3. Implementation of the system design.
step, the server encrypts the hash function with its own private key by using RSA encryption
algorithm, which creates the signature. Finally, the signature and the data are merged by
the server and sent to the device as digitally signed data. After the device receives the signed
data, it needs to verify it. First, the signature is decrypted with the server’s public key by
using the same algorithm; then the device creates another hash code from the data. Finally,
if the two hash codes match with each other, the authenticity of the data is ensured.
4.3 Registration Phase
The authentication protocol and registration methodology were discussed in Chapter 3.
One particular registration process was implemented in order to perform the authentication
protocol. In this section, the registration phase implementation is explained in detail.
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Figure 4.4. First step of the device pairing process.
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Figure 4.5. Second step of the device pairing process.
Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 demonstrate the registration process in two steps. In the first
step (Figure 4.4), an email address and a unique device name need to be entered to identify
the device and the user. After the server receives the registration request from the first
device, first it validates the information by checking whether the device name is unique and
the email address has not been registered before. If the device and the user are valid, the
server starts a timer to open a time frame to limit second device registration duration. If the
second device isn’t registered in this time frame and the timer expires, the email becomes
blacklisted in the server.
In the second step (Figure 4.5), the second device sends the same email address and a
unique device name. Then, the server validates the user and the device identities by applying
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the same process in the first step. In this moment, in order to confirm the user’s identity, a
One Time Password (OTP) was used. The server generates an OTP by using Java security
API [42]. Then, the server sends the OTP to the email address, which is already provided by
the user. The OTP should be entered on the second device within the time frame, which is
already started in the first step by the server. After this step, if the timer is still not expired,
the server associates these two devices with each other and with the user. Furthermore, the
server stores the identity information of the associated devices in the system database.
4.4 Authentication Phase
In this section, a different set of implementations of the authentication process will be
presented. All these implementations were embodied from the authentication protocol con-
cept presented in Chapter 3. Although these implementations were designed with a different
set of system configurations, they use the same shared modules.
The following implementations use the same infrastructure implementation presented in
Section 4.1. As an authenticator system, the web server implementation presented in Sub-
section 4.1.1 was used. For the device association and the user initialization, the registration
phase presented in Section 4.3 was used. Furthermore, the cryptographic infrastructure
implementation presented in Section 4.2 was used to ensure the network security of the
implementations.
4.4.1 Implementation: Device One: a Smartphone, Device Two: a Smartphone,
Challenge Transmission by QR Code
In this implementation, two Android smartphones were used to represent the first and
second devices in the authentication protocol. Additionally, an Android application was
designed and implemented to operate the authentication process. Before the authentication
process starts, the registration phase presented in Section 4.3 was performed in order to
associate the devices with each other.
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Server First Smartphone Second Smartphone
1 - Access Request
2 – Challenge: QR code
3 – QR Code
5 - Access Granted
4 -  Random Number
Figure 4.6. Implementation: two smartphones - QR code.
Figure 4.6 demonstrates this specific implementation. After the first step, when the
server receives the access request, it creates a 32-bit alpha numeric random number using
Java security API [42]. Then, the server generates a QR code from the random number.
To compute a QR code from the random generated number, Google Zxing open source
framework [43] was used.
In the second step, the server sends this QR code as a challenge. After the second step,
when the first smartphone receives the challenge, it locally broadcasts the QR code to the
other associated device by displaying the QR code on its screen as shown in Figure 4.7.
The second device scans the QR code (Figure 4.8) and extracts the random number, which
was already created by the server. To read the QR code, Google Zxing framework was
implemented in the Android application. In the fourth step, the second smartphone sends
the random number to the server. The server runs an algorithm to validate the request as
discussed in Chapter 3. In the fifth step, if the request is valid, the server grants access to
the smartphone. Finally, the server successfully authenticates the Android application.
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Figure 4.7. QR code displayed. Figure 4.8. Scanning the QR code.
Server First Smartphone Second Smartphone
1 - Access Request
2 – Challenge: Random Number
3 – Random Number
5 - Access Granted
4 -  Random Number
NFC
Figure 4.9. Implementation: two smartphones - NFC.
4.4.2 Implementation: Device One: a Smartphone, Device Two: a Smartphone,
Challenge Transmission by NFC
Similarly to the implementation presented in Subsection 4.4.1, this implementation uses
two Android smartphones during the authentication process. However, for the challenge
transmission, Near Field Communication (NFC) technology was implemented. Instead of
scanning the QR code, two smartphones need to be tapped together in order to transmit the
challenge.
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Figure 4.10. Challenge locally broadcasted. Figure 4.11. Extracting the number.
Figure 4.9 illustrates this specific implementation with NFC. Different from the previous
implementation (Subsection 4.4.1), after the first step, when the server receives the access
request, the server creates a random number, but it doesn’t generate a QR code. Instead of
sending the QR code, the server sends the generated random number to the first device as
shown in the second step. When the second device receives the random number, it locally
broadcasts it by opening an NFC connection as shown in Figure 4.10. NFC is a set of
technologies that transmits data over radio waves by bringing the devices into proximity
(generally a distance of 10 cm or less) [44]. To implement the challenge transmission process
via NFC, Android NFC library was used [45]. In the third step, to perform the challenge,
users need to tap devices together to establish radio communication as shown in Figure 4.11.
Then, the second smartphone extracts the random number and sends it to the server as
shown in the fourth step. Finally, the server validates the request and grants access to the
first device.
4.4.3 Implementation: Device One: a Laptop Computer, Device Two: a Smart-
phone, Challenge Transmission by QR Code
In this implementation, a laptop computer represents the first device and a smartphone
represents the second device. For challenge transmission, a QR code was implemented.
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Server Laptop Computer Smartphone
1 - Access Request
2 – Challenge: QR code
3 – QR Code
5 - Access Granted
4 -  Random Number
Figure 4.12. Implementation: laptop - smartphone - QR code.
To associate the smartphone with the laptop computer, the particular registration phase
implementation was performed (Section 4.3). An Android application, which is the same
application used in the first and second configurations, was used in this implementation
to operate authentication process on the smartphone. For the laptop computer (the first
device) a Java desktop application was designed and developed. For this implementation,
a laptop computer was used. Additionally, the developed desktop application was designed
to be operated on cross platforms. Hence, it can run on Windows, Mac OS X or Linux
empowered computers.
Figure 4.12 demonstrates this specific implementation in detail. In the first step, the
laptop computer wants to access to the system. Similar to the first implementation as
presented in Subsection 4.4.1, the server sends a challenge via QR code. In the second
step, the computer receives this QR code and locally broadcasts it by displaying it on the
screen as shown in Figure 4.13. And the rest of the process follows as similar to the first
implementation. The smartphone scans the QR code, extracts the random generated number
and sends it to the server. Finally, the server grants or denies access to the laptop computer.
This implementation allows users to access the systems from their laptop computer by using
their smartphone.
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Figure 4.13. QR code displayed on the laptop screen.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this chapter, the new authentication protocol design presented in Chapter 3 will be
examined, and the implementations presented in Chapter 4 will be tested in detail. First,
the authentication protocol was validated by using an automated validation tool for Internet
security protocols. Then, the implementations were tested by using different devices and
platforms to determine their performance.
5.1 Model Checking
In this section, the authentication protocol is modelled and verified. To verify that the
authentication protocol guarantees authenticity and secrecy of the communication between
devices and the authenticator server, a model checker must be used. Thus, AVISPA [46]
model checker was used to check authenticity and secrecy properties. Automated Validation
of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) is an automated model checker
for large scaled security protocols. The AVISPA automation tool supports four verification
backend tools [47]:
• OFMC (On-the-fly model checker)
• CL-AtSe (Constraint Logic based Attack Searcher)
• SATMC (SAT-based Model-Checker)
• TA4SP (Tree based model checker)
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Figure 5.1. HLPSL specification in Alice and Bob notation.
CL-AtSe and SATMC backend platforms are used to verify the bounded number of
sessions and protocol falsification. OFMC backend is useful for detecting guessing and
replay attacks [47]. TA4SP backend provides unbounded security protocol verification by
using tree-based languages [47].
5.1.1 Modelling the Protocol
In order to verify the authentication protocol with AVISPA, the protocol was modelled
with HLPSL. High-Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) is a language for mod-
elling and specifying security protocols. HLPSL uses Alice and Bob notation to model
security protocols [48].
The authentication protocol was modelled by using HLPSL in Alice and Bob notation
as shown in Figure 5.1. The server represents the system that authenticates the devices.
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Alice represents the first device and Bob represents the second device of the authentication
protocol. Ka, Kb, Ks are the public keys of the first device, the second device, and the server
respectively. The inverse function (inv) retrieves the private keys of the public keys.
There are two security goals exist in the AVISPA. To verify if the devices are being
authenticated, the following goals were specified:
• Authentication on the first device
• Authentication on device two
Furthermore, to verify if the authentication communication was kept secret, the following
goal was specified:
• Secrecy of hashed message
5.1.2 Results
The automated validation was performed on the specified protocol (Figure 5.1) by using
the AVISPA model checker. During the experiments a laptop computer was used. The
laptop computer is a MacBook Pro, which has 8GB RAM, a 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 processor
and 750GB storage.
Table 5.1 summarises the results of the verification. To verify the bounded number of
sessions and protocol falsification, CL-AtSe and SATMC backend platforms were used [47].
CL-AtSe completed the verification in 6 seconds by analyzing 2470 states. Also, it took
285.13 seconds to complete verification with SATMC. As a result, both backends did not
find any possible attacks on the protocol. To detect guessing and replay attacks, the protocol
was verified by OFMC backend. OFMC ran a heuristic search algorithm with 1000000 plies
and analyzed 68 total nodes. As a result, the authentication protocol proposed in Chapter 3
was validated by using an automated tool for verification of the security protocols.
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Table 5.1. Model checker result
Backend Summary Statistics
CL-AtSe SAFE Analysed: 2470 states
Reachable: 2470 states
Translation: 0.02 seconds
Computation: 6.0 seconds
SATMC SAFE attackFound: false
upperBoundReached:true
graphLeveledOff: 7 steps
satSolver: zchaff solver
maxStepsNumber: 30 steps
stepsNumber: 7 steps
encodingTime: 285.13
seconds
solvingTime: 0 seconds
if2sateCompilationTime:
0.49 seconds
OFMC SAFE parseTime: 0.00s
searchTime: 5.86s
visitedNodes: 68 nodes
depth: 1000000 plies
5.2 Experimental Testing
Different versions of the authentication protocol were designed and implemented as pre-
sented in Chapter 4. In this section, the presented implementations will be explored to
measure the performance overhead.
5.2.1 Experimental Setup
The implementations of the authentication protocol use two devices and a web server
application. During the experiments, three different Android smartphones and two different
laptop computers were used. Table 5.2 shows the technical specifications of the devices, which
are used during the experiments. One device is a Samsung Galaxy S3 I9300, which has a
Quad-core 1.4 GHz processor, 1GB RAM, 16GB storage, a 2100mAh lithium ion battery, a
8MP camera and Android 4.4.4 operating system. The second mobile device is a LG Nexus
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Table 5.2. Test devices’ technical specifications
Device name Technical specification
Samsung Galaxy S3 I9300 Quad-core 1.4 GHz CPU
1GB RAM
16GB storage
2100mAh lithium ion battery
8MP camera
Android 4.4.4 operating system
LG Nexus 4 Quad-core 1.5 GHz CPU
2GB RAM
16GB storage
2100mAh lithium ion battery
8MP camera
Android 4.4.4 operating system
Motorola Nexus 6 Quad-core 2.7 GHz CPU
3GB RAM
32GB storage
3320mAh lithium ion battery
13MP camera
Android 5.0 operating system
MacBook Pro 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 CPU
8GB RAM
750GB storage
Mac OS X Yosemite operating system
Windows computer 2.1 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU
8GB RAM
250GB storage
Windows 7 operating system
4, which has a quad-core 1.5 GHz processor, 2GB RAM, 16GB storage, a 2100mAh lithium
ion battery, a 8MP Camera and Android 4.4.4 operating system. The last smartphone is a
Motorola Nexus 6, which has Qualcomm Snapdragon 805 processor with 2.7GHz quad-core
processor, 3GB RAM, 32GB storage, a 3320mAh lithium ion battery, a 13MP camera and
android 5.0 operating system. The web server application was run on a MacBook Pro, which
has 8GB RAM, a 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 750GB storage. The other laptop
computer is a Windows 7 machine, which has 8GB RAM, a 2.1 GHz Intel Core i5 processor
and 250GB storage.
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Figure 5.2. Authentication time measurement of the protocol.
For each protocol implementation, the same tests were performed. For each test, 20 iter-
ations of the authentication procedure were executed to measure the average authentication
time, memory usage, network consumption, and battery drain on each device. Authentica-
tion time was measured by summing up two different timer functions not including human
interaction time. The first timer starts at time T1 and ends at time T3 as shown in Fig-
ure 5.2. Then the second timer starts at time T4 and ends at time T6. As a result, execution
time calculated as shown below:
ExecutionT ime = (T3− T1) + (T6− T4)
The memory usage was measured by Android DDMS (Dalvik Debug Monitor Server) [49].
The sampling frequency of the allocated memory on the heap was set to 10 seconds. The
network consumption was measured by the network traffic tool provided by Android DDMS.
To measure battery consumption, a third-party tool was used. During the experiments,
mobile devices and computers never went to sleep. Target programs were compiled with
Eclipse Luna using required frameworks. The web server application implementation has a
total of 2184 lines of code (not including empty lines). The desktop application has a total
of 1339 lines of code (not including empty lines) and the Android mobile application has a
total of 2467 lines of code without empty lines.
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Table 5.3. Protocol implementation test configurations
Test configuration
described in Sub-
section 5.2.2.1
Test configuration
described in Sub-
section 5.2.2.1
Test configuration
described in Sub-
section 5.2.2.2
Test configuration
described in Sub-
section 5.2.2.3
First Device Samsung Galaxy S3 LG Nexus 4 Samsung Galaxy S3 Laptop
Second Device LG Nexus 4 Samsung Galaxy S3 LG Nexus 4 LG Nexus 6
Challenge QR Code QR Code NFC QR Code
Table 5.4. Experimental results with the first configuration described in Subsection 5.2.2.1
Device Execution Time (s) Network Usage (bytes) Memory Usage (MB) Battery Consump-
tion (Joule)
First Device
(Samsung S3)
0.0754 4749.3 4.055 14.4
Second Device
(LG Nexus 4)
0.0754 476.2 9.380 4.1
5.2.2 Results
Table 5.3 shows the different test configurations with multiple devices. These test configu-
rations were designed to evaluate the individual performance of each protocol implementation
presented in Chapter 4.
5.2.2.1 Test: Device One: a Smartphone, Device Two: a Smartphone, Chal-
lenge Transmission by QR Code
The authentication protocol implementation presented in Subsection 4.4.1 was tested.
Two Android smartphones were used to represent the first and second devices. In this
implementation, two sets of tests were performed. First, the experiments were performed
with a Samsung Galaxy S3 as the first device and an LG Nexus 4 as the second device.
Then, the second experiments were performed with an LG Nexus 4 as the first device and a
Samsung Galaxy S3 as the second device.
Table 5.4 shows the test results with a Samsung Galaxy S3 as the first device and an LG
Nexus 4 as the second device. Similarly, Table 5.5 shows the results with an LG Nexus 4 as
the first device and a Samsung Galaxy S3 as the second device. Average execution time for
one complete authentication is 0.0754 seconds with the first configuration. To demonstrate
the efficiency of the system, the time performance was measured with a different set of
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Table 5.5. Experimental results with the second configuration described in Subsection 5.2.2.1
Device Execution Time (s) Network Usage (bytes) Memory Usage (MB) Battery Consump-
tion (Joule)
First Device
(LG Nexus 4)
0.0739 4674.3 10.2 11.3
Second Device
(Samsung S3)
0.0739 481.2 3.3 5
smartphones, in which the first device was upgraded to a device with better resources (e.g.,
faster CPU, bigger memory) as shown in Table 5.5. As a result, execution time was not
significantly affected by the specification of the device.
The network usage for the first device is approximately 10 times higher than the second
device on each test. Indeed, the server exchanges more data with the first device. There
are three network communications between the server and the first device and one of them
contains an image. Between the server and the second device, there is only one network
communication, and this communication does not contain large data (e.g., an image).
The LG Nexus 4 consumes more memory than the Samsung Galaxy S3 in each test.
Memory allocation is managed by the Android operating system [50]. Since the LG Nexus 4
has larger memory, the memory allocation on runtime is larger for the LG Nexus 4 regardless
of its role (e.g., the first or second device) in the authentication system.
Since both smartphones are using the same battery, it is expected that they will have close
battery consumption results during the authentication process. The slight difference comes
from the screen contrast setup of each phone. Furthermore, the network consumption causes
a slight difference between the first and second device on the battery consumption. Since
the first device uses more network, it also consumes more battery. To better understand
the battery drain, average battery consumption of the Android message application was
measured while sending a message. To send a message, this application consumes 7.4j energy
with the Samsung Galaxy S3.
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Table 5.6. Experimental results described in Subsection 5.2.2.2
Device Execution Time (s) Network Usage (bytes) Memory Usage (MB) Battery Consump-
tion (Joule)
First Device
(Samsung S3)
0.0689 628.2 3.65 8.2
Second Device
(LG Nexus 4)
0.0689 476.2 8.992 5.6
5.2.2.2 Test: Device One: a Smartphone, Device Two: a Smartphone, Chal-
lenge Transmission by NFC
The authentication protocol implementation presented in Subsection 4.4.2 was tested.
Similar to the previous implementation, this implementation also contains two Android
smartphones to represent the first and second devices. Furthermore, NFC technology was
used to transmit the challenge. One set of tests was performed to measure the performance
differences while transmitting the challenge with NFC technology. The experiment was
performed with a Samsung Galaxy S3 as the first device and an LG Nexus 6 as the second
device.
Table 5.6 shows the experimental results for the specific implementation presented in
Subsection 4.4.2. The average execution time for one authentication process is 0.0689 sec-
onds. Since only one device is being authenticated during the authentication process, the
same execution time was measured for both devices.
The network usage for the first device is approximately 30% greater than the second de-
vice. Sending a random number instead of a QR code image for challenge transmission results
closer network usage numbers for both devices. Because the first device makes more network
communications than the second device during the authentication process, the battery usage
is slightly higher in the first device.
5.2.2.3 Test: Device One: a Laptop Computer, Device Two: a Smartphone,
Challenge Transmission by QR Code
The last experiment was performed on the implementation presented in Subsection 4.4.3.
Instead of using two Android devices, a Windows laptop computer and an Android smart-
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Table 5.7. Experimental results described in Subsection 5.2.2.3
Device Execution Time (s) Network Usage (bytes) Memory Usage (MB) Battery Consump-
tion (Joule)
First Device
(Windows Computer)
0.0717 4987 80 16.9
Second Device
(Motorola Nexus 6)
0.0717 520 22 6.1
Table 5.8. Implementations with different system configurations described in Chapter 4
Implementation system
configuration 1
Implementation system
configuration 2
Implementation system
configuration 3
First Device Smartphone Smartphone Laptop
Second Device Smartphone Smartphone Smartphone
Challenge QR Code NFC QR Code
phone (Motorola Nexus 6) were used for the authentication process. For challenge transmis-
sion, a QR code image was used.
Table 5.7 presents the test results for the specific implementation presented in Subsec-
tion 4.4.3. Similar to the previous tests, the execution time measured the same for the first
and second device. QR code image dominates the network usage on the first device. On
the other hand, since the smartphone only sends a random number, not the QR code, the
network usage on the second device is noticeably lower than the first device.
The first device uses 80 MB and the second device uses 22 MB of memory space. Memory
allocation is entirely managed by the Windows and Android operating systems for the laptop
computer and the smartphone respectively. Hence, the monitored memory space is not
related to application size.
5.2.3 Analysis
The individual performance overheads for each implementation were presented in Sec-
tion 5.2.2. In this subsection, performance differences between the implementations will be
compared and analyzed with each other in detail.
Table 5.8 summarizes the hardware configurations used in the different implementations.
The first and second implementation configurations use the same set of devices. However, for
the challenge transmission, QR code was used in the first configuration and NFC technology
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Figure 5.3. Average execution time for each configuration.
was used in the second configuration. The devices used in the third configuration have better
system resources (faster CPU, larger memory) than the devices used in the first and second
configurations.
5.2.3.1 Execution Time
Figure 5.3 shows the average authentication time for each implementation configuration.
There is a slight performance difference between the first and second configurations. The
only hardware difference between the first and second configurations is the first device.
Instead of a smartphone, a laptop computer was used to represent the first device in the
third configuration. For the challenge transmission both implementations use a QR code.
Since the network card on the computer is faster than smartphones, the hardware of the
devices cause that small performance difference.
A larger difference was observed between the first and second configurations. The authen-
tication process is approximately 0.01 seconds faster in the second configuration. Although
both tests were performed with the same devices, the second configuration uses NFC tech-
nology instead of a QR code. In the first configuration, after the server generates a random
number, the server needs to generate a QR code from the random number. Whereas, in
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Figure 5.4. Average network usage for each configuration.
the second configuration, after the server generates a random number, the server directly
sends the random number to the access requesting device. The QR code generation and
transmission process adds around 0.01 seconds to the whole execution time.
5.2.3.2 Network Usage
Figure 5.4 illustrates the average network usage during the experiments. Similar to the
execution time, the network usage results for the first and third configurations are fairly
close to each other. Since they both use a QR code image for the challenge transmission,
they exchange around 2.5MB of data during the authentication process.
The network usage for the second configuration is significantly lower than the network
usage in the first and third configurations. Since the second configuration does not send or
receive a large file (e.g., QR code image) during the authentication, the whole authentication
can be performed using under 1MB of data.
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Figure 5.5. Average memory usage for each configuration.
5.2.3.3 Memory Usage
The dynamic memory allocation is mainly managed by operating systems. Hence, the
developed applications for authentication protocol implementation do not have direct access
to the memory. Although, to demonstrate the memory usage over different devices, memory
tests were performed on each configuration as shown in Figure 5.5. The first and second
configurations use the same set of devices (Samsung S3, LG Nexus 4). Therefore, these
memory usage results are almost the same.
The third configuration was tested with two high-end devices. To represent the first
device, a laptop computer with 8GB main memory was used. Also, to perform the challenge,
a powerful smartphone (Motorola Nexus 6) with 3GB main memory was used. Since these
devices have very large main memory compared to the Samsung Galaxy S3 and the LG Nexus
5, larger memory space was allocated for both applications by their operating systems.
Memory allocation results showed that the presented authentication method can run on
devices, which have low memory capacities (less than 1GB main memory).
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Figure 5.6. Average battery consumption for each configuration.
5.2.3.4 Battery Consumption
The average battery consumption is illustrated for each configuration in Figure 5.6. To
better understand the battery consumption in different systems, Android messaging applica-
tion’s battery usage was measured while sending a message over the network. To send only
one message over the network, the messaging application uses 7.4j of energy.
The second configuration consumes the least battery of all the configurations. Since the
only difference between the first and second configurations was the challenge transmission,
reading and decoding the QR code causes relatively higher battery consumption on devices.
However, the largest battery consumption was noticed in the third configuration, which also
uses a QR code for the challenge transmission.
The laptop computer and the smartphone used in the third configuration have more
powerful CPUs than the devices used in the first configuration. Thus, more energy was
consumed while performing an authentication process with a laptop computer and a more
powerful smartphone. Nevertheless, devices used in the third configuration have larger bat-
teries, thus the authentication process’ impact on the battery usage was as low as the usage
of the first and second configurations.
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5.2.3.5 Conclusion
The authentication protocol implementations’ performances were analyzed in terms of
execution time, network usage, memory usage, and battery consumption in the previous
subsections.
The greatest performance differences were caused by the challenge transmission method-
ology. Instead of using a QR code, sending only a random number as a challenge dramatically
increased the performance of the execution time and the network usage. Sound waves, in-
frared technology, or motion detection can also be used as alternatives to a QR code in order
to improve the performance of the authentication process.
In addition, the different device hardware specifications did not significantly effect the
network usage. However, the execution time performance slightly increased while using
higher performance devices during the authentication process. Moreover, the variety of the
devices showed that the proposed authentication protocol can be implemented by using even
slower devices.
Finally, none of the configurations significantly effected the battery life of the devices
during the authentication process.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this chapter, several extensions will be addressed and future opportunities will be
discussed.
Although many authentication schemes are being introduced, most of them are vulner-
able to theft-based attacks. The new authentication protocol using two associated devices
has been proposed to minimize attack surface over theft-based attacks. Several real-life ex-
amples of the authentication protocol were designed and implemented by using multiple sets
of devices. Then, the authentication protocol was modeled with a high level protocol spec-
ification language and verified by a model checker in order to indicate the soundness of its
secrecy and authenticity properties. Finally, the performance overhead of the protocol was
evaluated to demonstrate the performance differences between multiple implementations.
6.1 Add/Remove Devices
A particular registration method was implemented and used in all configurations to pair
devices with each other and the user. This registration phase can be done only once. To
increase usability, it would be a very useful feature to allow users to add or remove additional
devices into the system after the first device pairing process.
6.2 Continuous Authentication
Continuous authentication is an emerging topic in the security field. The main concern
in standard user authentication schemes (e.g., username/password) is that after a certain
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amount of time the user can become inactive. However, asking for authentication within a
period of time could be used to track activity of the user.
In the proposed authentication protocol, if the system successfully authenticates the user,
then that authentication remains active until the defined session time. However, an attacker
can steal the authenticated device before the authentication session expires and get access to
the system. To solve this problem, a continuous authentication approach could be integrated
into the proposed implementations. The system could send a challenge to the first device
every few minutes, and the user could perform this challenge with the second device in order
to keep authenticated.
6.3 Future Experiments
Various experiments have been performed on the proposed implementation to demon-
strate the performance overhead of the authentication system. During the experiments, the
user interaction time was not considered. Using human participants and measuring their
challenge performing times could be a good way to evaluate real authentication time with
user interaction. Furthermore, similar experiments could be performed on other authenti-
cation schemes (e.g., username and password, physical token, two-factor authentication) to
illustrate the performance advantages and disadvantages over different schemes.
6.4 Future Implementations
In Chapter 4, three particular implementations were presented. These authentication
protocol implementations introduce solutions to distinct authentication problems. However,
it would be useful to demonstrate more implementations to solve real life authentication
problems.
Table 6.1 shows further possible implementations to solve common authentication prob-
lems in daily life. One general problem with cars is if the car key is stolen, an attacker also
can steal the car itself. However, adopting the proposed authentication protocol could solve
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Table 6.1. Further implementation ideas
Authenticator System First device Second device Challenge transmission
method
Car Smartwatch Smartphone NFC
Home door Smartphone Smartwatch QR code
Hotel door Smartring Smartwatch NFC
Garage door Car Smartphone Bluetooth
GPS navigator Car Smartphone Bluetooth
Military facility Smart necklace Smartwatch Bluetooth
Server Laptop Smartwatch Image
the problem without extra overhead cost. For example, the car can represent the authentica-
tor system. When the user gets close to the car, the car sends a challenge to the smartwatch,
then the user taps the smartphone to perform the challenge. Finally, the smartphone sends
the challenge back to the car and the car unlocks the doors and/or starts the car.
Another common problem is garage door or facility gate access. In this particular prob-
lem, the garage door represents the authenticator system and the user’s car and smartphone
act as the first and second devices. When the car gets close to the garage door, the garage
door sends a challenge to the car. Then, the smartphone reads this challenge via bluetooth,
and sends it back to the garage door. Finally, the garage authenticates the car and opens
the door.
Alternatively, this authentication protocol can be implemented with any other lock sys-
tem. The lock can act as the authenticator system and the user’s multiple devices (e.g., a
smart ring and a smart military necklace, a smart “dog tag”) can act as the first and second
devices. When the user comes within a threshold proximity of the lock, the smart ring will
initiate the authentication protocol with the lock. Then, the lock sends a challenge to the
smart ring. The smart ring sends the challenge to the smart dog tag. In this particular
implementation, the protocol executes automatically, without user involvement, based on
proximity to the lock.
Furthermore, more than two devices could be implemented during the authentication
process. Two devices might not be enough for theft protection, especially when authenticat-
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ing users to more sensitive information, such as, military source, intelligence agency source,
etc. In this particular solution, a military base could house an authenticator system, and a
user could use a smartphone, a smartwatch and a smart ring all together in order to complete
authentication.
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